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Liberals, the Hijab and the Denial of Full Equality

Alana Lentin — Tue, 07 Jul 2009 13:36:50 +0000

The funeral of Marwa Sherwini

This article is also published on Multiculturality

The funeral of Marwa Sherbini was held in Alexandria on Monday July 6, 2009. 32 year old Marwa, who was three months pregnant, was stabbed eighteen times in thirty seconds by Axel W, a 28 year old German man in a court in Dresden in front of her husband and 3-year old son among countless others. While stabbing Marwa, Axel W shouted “you have no right to live.” Her husband was also injured when he was shot in the leg by a German security officer while he was trying to protect his wife.

“Ms Sherbini had sued her killer after he called her a “terrorist” because of her headscarf… Axel W and Ms Sherbini and family were in court for his appeal against a fine of 750 euros ($1,050) for insulting her in 2008, apparently because she was wearing the Muslim headscarf or Hijab.” (BBC News)

As reported here, Axel W also called Marwa Sherbini “islamist” and “bitch” when she asked him to make room for her son to play on swings at a local park.As the BBC reports, “the case has attracted much attention in Egypt and the Muslim world.” No doubt, for Egypt and the Muslim world the stand Ms Sherbini took against Axel W for insulting her for wearing the headscarf was seen as a courageous one in the face of western hostility to the Islamic hijab, hostility that has only been exacerbated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s recent outbursts on the burkha. However, for ever growing numbers of western commentators, many of them far from willing to endorse violent acts such as that committed against Marwa Sherbini, her case against Axel W will not have been viewed as favourably. Indeed, the fact that Sherbini won damages against Axel W for associating her wearing of the hijab with terrorism or islamism (leaving aside the hackneyed old gendered slander: ‘bitch’) would have stuck in the throat of many liberal commentators throughout Europe. This is because it has now become standard for liberals to conflate the religious symbols of Islam, the wearing of the hijab in particular, as at best a visible sign of separation and a rejection of national/European/western ‘values’ and, at worst, as tacit support for the actions of Islamist terrorists. Whereas these upstanding commentators would no doubt abhor the murder of Marwa Sherbini, some of their linguistic associations – hijab=terrorist – do not stray far from those originally made by Axel W.

Among those who call themselves liberal, something odd appears to be happening since September 11 2001. The word ‘liberal’ is increasingly being used as a synonym for ‘western’ or indeed coupled, as in the phrase “liberal, western values…” Thus, on the one hand, ‘liberal values’, which broadly speaking are said to be things like democracy, tolerance, freedom of speech, and respect for the rule of law, are upheld as standards that should be universally respected. On the other hand, however, no sooner have they been delcared universal are they said to be something that is unique to the west which those of other ‘cultures’ are almost innately unable to understand never mind uphold.

This of course depends on who the non-western target of the discourse is. Educated and apparently ‘westernised’ students in Iran, perhaps because of their knowledge of English or their penchant for the niceties of western consumer culture, can be included within a universalistic vision of liberalism. The fact that all Iranian women wear the headscarf is excused on the basis of the belief, whether this is actually the case or not, that they would remove it at the drop of a hat if they could.

In contrast, hijab wearing women in Europe itself, recent migrants or long-standing citizens alike, are less tolerated. Despite the fact that, as citizens or residents of European countries, it would be expected that their choice to wear the hijab could be seen as just one among any number of ‘choices’ open to those living in democractic, egalitarian, liberal societies, they are singled-out as throw-backs to a dangerous pre-modern age, the apparent antithesis of everthing that Europe struggled to rid itself of.

Christopher Caldwell’s ‘The Revolution in Europe: Can Europe be the Same with Different People in it?’

Among these liberals, there is genuine distaste for the fact that many European Muslims have not seamlessly assimilated European ‘values’ and have appeared, as Christopher Caldwell claims, to have retained “the habits and cultures of southern villages, clans, marketplaces, and mosques.” But where this has been the case, because it is is far from being universally true, there has been little effort made to explain why there has not been a relinquishing of tradition. Western liberals are unable to explain this because they are so utterly convinced of the superiority of their own culture which, because they believe in its ultimate universal applicability, are incredulous is being rejected.

What this view fails to see of course is that firstly, what appears as traditionalism can often be a conscious, political rejection of western ways of life that appear contradictory and hypocritical, particularly in light of Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. Secondly, it ignores that universalism is in itself culturally specific and cannot, as the French philosopher Etienne Balibar reminds us, be disassociated from the particular trajectory of European racism and nationalism, a trajectory which was ultimately based upon the project of defining the ideal (male) subject.

Thirdly, universalist liberalism is far from having been instilled in the West itself. There appears to be a wholesale confusion between the apparent choice afforded us by capitalism and real freedom. When Islam is contrasted with western values, particularly in the citizenship policies of the various European states that have introduced citizenship testing, integration programmes, and community cohesion agendas, what is actually happening is that two culturally specific ways of doing things are being pitted against each other. The fact that it is impossible to definitively flesh out what either ‘national values’ or ‘Islam’ actually entail matters little. For liberal commentators, policy-makers, and Muslim community leaders alike, they must nevertheless be adhered to.

This is particularly pernicious when the integration of a set of ill-defined, or indeed indefinable, values is being made contingent for acceptance within society, as is the case in most European countries today. Unable either to define the values to be assimilated or to conclusively state what would constitute a completed integration process, outward symbols such as the hijab, the turban or the beard are being taken as proof that an individual has integrated inadequately whether or not the wearing of such symbols actually bears any relationship to the individual wearer’s attitude to their country, or indeed to the more problematic elements of his/her religion.

If anything, the stance Marwa Sherbini took against Axel W in taking him to court for incitement demonstrates that she had indeed assimilated some of the values that, it is to be presumed, liberals hold dear. She exercised her right to be treated equally within German society and not to be insulted for making a personal choice to wear the hijab. However, what has become undoubtedly true in the current climate is that, despite their call for universalism, many liberals see the freedoms of some as being more worthy of protection than others. Thus, because Islam is seen by many as a religion that denies rights to non-Muslims, whether or not this is the case, those who seek freedom to practice their faith without the risk of insult or constraint should de facto be seen as less equal than others.

It has become a commonplace in liberal circles to decry ‘political correctness’ in relation to race and religion, Muslims in particular, and to claim that a hierarchy of victimhood has led to discrimination faced by other minorities being ignored, a favoured line of the gay rights campaigner Peter Tatchell. Beyond the fact that pitting disadvantaged groups against each other in such a way is entirely counterproductive in the aim of achieving a fairer society, this view tacitly endorses the notion that it is time that some groups were denied full access to their rights. Practicing Muslims in particular are held individually responsible for everything from sexism, homophobia, genital mutilation, forced marriages and honor killings, right up to riots and suicide bombings. Hence, it is only fitting that they are denied equality until such time that they integrate (again, into what it is unclear) or are defeated.

Unfortunately, the knots in which such liberal thinking ties itself are not obvious to the vast numbers of those for whom writers such as British journalist Nick Cohen or Dutch-Somali integrationist Ayaan Hirsi Ali are heroic in their stance against what they see as the onslaught of illiberal Islam. It seems that where Muslims are concerned, it is unnecessary to bring such ‘liberal’ arguments to their logical conclusions and to admit that they are not all as egalitarian as they profess to be. Rather, the rush to pit illiberal Islam against the liberal West will indeed lead to the segregated societies that Muslims in Europe have already been blamed for constructing, if not to a much worse future in which, due to the increasing authoritarianism of western states desperate to crush apparent extremism, liberalism in any form will be but a distant dream.

Equalities and Diversity Summer School

Alana Lentin — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 17:58:24 +0000

The following is the transcript of a presentation on the Questioning the European ‘Crisis of Multiculturalism’ project given at the Edge Hill University Centre for Local Policy Studies Summer School on July 1 2009.

What exemplifies the ‘crisis’?
The last few days have provided us several neatly packaged examples of the type of thing that passes as emblematic of the by-now almost undisputed ‘fact’ that multiculturalism in Europe is in crisis.

In the UK, Gordon Brown has announced what was quickly dubbed as a ‘British homes for British workers’ scheme. Under this, what have been described as ‘local’ British people waiting for local social housing will be given preference over ‘outsiders’ .The terms of this proposal pit the ‘deserving’ over the ‘undeserving’ in the barely veiled implication that the divide between the two is culturally defined.Commentators have been quick to point out that the policy is an attempt by a flailing New Labour regime to respond to the threat of the BNP in their traditional stomping ground. But, as Gary Younge noted yesterday also, it would be short-sighted to see this type of policy proposal as originating uniquely with the far-right.

Rather, it very much fits with what, in the first decade of the 21st century, has become a predominant political message across the board: that ‘too much diversity’, to cite David Goodhart, is responsible for much of Europe’s social ills, and that the policy that enabled ‘diverse groups’ to indelibly transform European societies – multiculturalism – must now be overturned.

A second example comes from France. President Sarkozy has proposed making the wearing of the burkha and niqab illegal, ostensibly because it is degrading to women and offends French secular values.

These examples from the last week illustrate the main points that we want to outline:

1.   That the ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ needs to be understood as a European (western) phenomenon which is also a highly mediated one.
2.   That debates about the end of multiculturalism do not have a stable object of critique. Speaking about the ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ is a way of not speaking about a range of other things. These ‘things’ are often to do with the mainly political and economic sources of inequality and social unrest that blight European societies. But they are also to do with a constant need for Europe to define what it is, a project that has for centuries been accomplished by contrasting it to what it is not. This was easier in the days of global European hegemony under colonialism but has become increasingly difficult in a postcolonial era increasingly defined by globalization.
3.   That the notion that multiculturalism is in crisis and the solutions being posed to this calamity (e.g. integration, cohesion) are part of a wider culturalisation of politics.

A mediated European crisis
The fact that the European ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ is a mediated one is made particularly clear by the example of the French opposition to the burkha.

It was not before France passed a law in 2004, effectively banning Muslim women from wearing the hijab in public institutions, that calls for a debate into what, in 2007, Jack Straw called a ‘visible sign of separation’ began elsewhere.

In 2007, the Irish police (Garda) refused to allow a Sikh recruit to wear his turban. This was followed closely by a school refusing to allow Muslim girls to come to lessons wearing the veil. While the Irish government eschewed a French-style headscarf ban, it cited the need to learn the lessons of other countries.

Here, like elsewhere (I’m thinking of Sikhs murdered in the US following 9/11), the turban and the hijab are conflated as orientalised tropes of difference. This demonstrates how brown skin and headgear have become markers of an incommensurable difference that is named ‘Islam’ but which targets a host of different-looking ‘others’.

Sarkozy’s recent proclamations on the burkha have led Irish politicians to call for an ‘honest debate’ on the role of Islam in Irish society and incited a question on last weekend’s BBC Question Time, demonstrating the slipperiness of the slope from the specifics of hijab-wearing to the generalisation of Islam (read Muslims) as posing a problem for society.

So, announcements of crisis, debates about diversity, and discussions of the place of minorities (most notably Muslims) in our societies are increasingly driven by two things:
1) media spectacles and events, and
2) mediated statements, reports and thinktank futorologies.

These circulate around Europe and are used to bolster arguments against immigration and for the curbing of undesirable diversity.

An example of the first is the Danish cartoons controversy. The cartoons first published in the Jyllands Posten were reproduced by newspapers across Europe in solidarity with the Danes who were seen as scapegoats for unjustified Islamist outrage.

The affair opened a debate, not about the nature of European Islamophobia – the cartoons linked the prophet Mohammed to suicide bombing – but about the primacy of freedom of speech, interpreted both as unidirectional – i.e. Europe’s freedom to critique others – and as a uniquely western/European value that has been eroded by ubiquitous ‘political correctness’.

An example of the second is the recent Civitas report on the introduction of elements of Sharia law in Britain (it is against). Rowan Williams’s tentative statements on the same topic were already picked up across Europe as an example of the ‘madness’ of unbridled multiculturalism, which the UK is – by now wrongly – seen as the supreme example of.

The extent to which these examples and others, most notably the 2005 riots in the French banlieues, are mediated – reproduced and translated to fit local contexts – means that they often take on a mythical status that no longer has (if it ever had) any relationship to reality.

For example, as demonstrated in Christopher Caldwell’s provocatively titled – Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Can Europe be the Same with Different People in it? – there is a belief (which he also seems to share) that multiculturalism has “left natives feeling like second-class citizens.” Whereas the belief may be felt, it cannot be argued that white people have really become second class citizens in Europe. Nevertheless, Caldwell cites a British report into white people’s feelings of powerlessness in the face of hegemonic minorities which no doubt can be used to justify anti-multiculturalist backlashes elsewhere.

Mythical or not, however, the mediated nature of the notion of crisis also helps us to see why it has such power. The circulation of stories, reports, spectacles and events of societal rupture apparently caused by too much diversity constructs what we are calling the ‘circuits of belief’ that uphold the ever-deepening belief that radical measures are needed to roll-back multiculturalism’s power to destroy the mythical homogeneity, tolerance and peacefulness of Europe as a whole or in it national parts.

Hence, it is the discursive power of crisis – and in particular the crisis of multiculturalism which deals in the currency of belonging, identity and entitlement – that we are most interested in.

Crisis of multiculturalism as euphemism
Most of the commentary on the idea that multiculturalism is dead has taken the debate at face value. This has led to even staunch critics of state multiculturalist policies, who spent years noting its essentialising drive, defending multiculturalism as being preferable over cohesion and integration.

On the other side, everyone from out-and-out racists, to liberal commentators to some feminists, secularists and gay rights activists has accepted the notion that multiculturalism poses a real threat to something that is variably known as European, national, or on a good day universal, values. These things are usually named as tolerance, democracy, respect for the rule of law, and freedom of speech.

Whatever side of the fence you sit on, we believe that it is not particularly beneficial to take the argument about the crisis of multiculturalism at face value if we want to understand it. So we have not been interested in normative debates about, for example, reconciling religious particularism with liberal values or whether or not Sharia law could be introduced in some form.

Rather, the debate over multiculturalism needs to be understood as a vehicle for animating and mediating a range of less concrete negotiations about belonging and legitimacy in a Europe that is looking increasingly inward in its quest to make sense of itself.

More than anything else, the crisis of multiculturalism can be seen as one instance in a series of debates and prescriptions that postcolonial, post-immigration Europe has set itself in the effort to cope with living with difference.

In this sense, it is a way of not talking about race – race being understood here as a uniquely western means for encapsulating irreconcilable human difference (rather than biology, skin colour etc.).

It is because modern Europe – in particular after the Holocaust and colonialism – has been unable to reconcile itself to the centrality of the structuring idea of race to its very foundations that successive generations have sought solutions in assimilation, multiculturalism, interculturalism, and now diversity and integration.

Race has always been about difference per se. This is what multiculturalism and the reification of something we called culture, but which often followed racial lines, also tried to cope with. The new challenge to multiculturalism and the ascent of diversity is also a way of damage controlling a difference that is racially marked: the rhetoric of crisis naturalises and fixes cultural differences as a problem.

The ultimate solution to this problem is to do away with the source of difference – the BNP’s response. The liberal version is to integrate it. The notion of integration as a solution to the problem caused by the fact of multiculture (rather than multicultural policy) allows for the return of a racial Europeanness mediated through discussions of values, civilisation, secularism/Christianity, liberalism, Enlightenment, and so forth.

For example, Christopher Caldwell again talks about the fundamental erosion of what he calls ‘the essence of Europe’. By doing so, he is both setting up the idea of a unified and homogeneous Europe that ignores the differences and antagonsims that exist across the continent, and pitting it against an enemy – in this case Islam and/or Muslims – which is equally racially construed.

In other words, the notion of crisis of multiculturalism barely covers up the race-thinking that its proponents – such as Caldwell – are trying to give voice to.

The Culturalisation of Politics
This leads me to the final part of our argument: that the crisis of multiculturalism is unable to get out of the cultural mire that it has itself identified as being the problem.

Part of the reason why arguments such as that of Caldwell or Goodhart in the UK, or Oriana Fallaci in Italy, Alain Finkelkraut in France or countless others are given such purchase is because they are coherent with an overall culturalisation of politics in which culture can be brought in as both problem and solution.

In The Expediency of Culture, George Yudice writes that “culture is being invoked to solve problems that previously were the province of economics and politics.”

He is right: In our neo-liberal and increasingly securitised societies the possibility for ordinary peope to participate in setting the political agenda has all but become impossible due both to the criminalisation of activism and protest and the lure of consumerism.

Culture has entered into this space as an easy shorthand for making sense of complex social, economic and political situations, such as inequality in housing, education and healthcare, unemployment, migration and so forth.

This I think sheds some light on why cohesion rather than equalities is emphasised as a solution in the UK today, as Stuart pointed out yesterday.

Ensuring equality requires legal mechanisms, retraining, and ultimately a shift in the political culture and social relations. Cohesion is less hardnosed. It is said to be about promoting a feeling of sharedness that is never really defined.

Of course, it can never be wholly defined because that would defeat the purpose. It would be impossible then to shift the goalposts of cohesion and integration – as is constantly being done in the lived-experience of those who are told to integrate – if we were to say that there is an end-point at which one has truly integrated or become socially cohesive.

The claim that there is a lack of social cohesion and the need to promote it would stop being a rhetorically powerful political device.

In other words, the culturalisation of politics is particularly potent because it is both the expression and the disavowal of racism.

On the one hand, by naming the problem as one of culture, we are saying that there are groups in society – most obviously today Muslims – who are conceived of as culturally (read racially) homogeneous and who disrupt our (fictional) societal unity. The similarities between this and classic racist arguments are easy to appreciate.

On the other hand, however, by naming the problem as cultural, or in particular religious or linguistic, we distance ourselves from the charge of racism.

As Martin Barker already observed in The New Racism in 1981, culturalist racism replaces geneticist arguments about biological difference with ones about cultural incompatibility. Therefore, what is experienced as racism becomes mere commonsense in the mouths of immigration ministers or liberal commentators.

But where this has gone a step further since Barker wrote in the 1980s is that it is no longer possible to ‘out’ culturalism as a form of racism. There has been an almost wholesale acceptance that we are post-race and that pointing out the incompatibility, for example, of ‘European tolerance’ with Islam or with too many immigrants is a neutral statement to make.

However, addressing the problems that are said to arise as a result of too much diversity politically through, for example, equalities legislation or fairer housing policies would be to admit that this is not wholly neutral. Hence, cultural solutions to cultural problems are sought, our favoured example being asking moderate imams to teach Muslim youth not to become radicalised as was proposed some years ago by the erstwhile Jackie Smith.

Quite simply, to admit to the underlying problems of local racism and global anger at the unjust foreign policies of western governments would be to admit that perhaps it is not the fact of diversity which has led to societies ‘sleepwalking to segregation’, if that is indeed happening.

We would have to admit that the crisis of multiculturalism argument is a symptom of a failure of politics and of political imagination out of which the tautological reasoning that sees culture as both problem and solution can emerge.

The fact is that there is no common vision of Europe to integrate into and that is most certainly no bad thing. But whether we think cohesion is good, bad or indifferent is mainly a diversion from the question that all the hand-wringing over the crisis of multiculturalism in Europe is not addressing, namely how to overcome the social, political and economic njustices that are almost exclusively borne by the poor and the racialised in our societies, and certainly not by the liberal elites convinced by the politics of fear that our (read their) way of life is under threat.